Although the Peninsula War of 1809-1814 has attracted a great deal of attention from historians, the extensive fortifications built in Portugal and known as the Lines of Torres Vedras have received very little attention. As Peninsula War expert Ian Fletcher notes in Osprey's Fortress volume #7 on that subject, only two previous books have focused specifically on these defenses which were so critical to the Duke of Wellington's operational planning. Indeed, Fletcher refers to the lines as "one of the best kept secrets in military history" and he describes the role these defenses played in halting and reversing the French invasion of Portugal in 1810.
The Lines of Torres Vedras 1809-1811 begins with a short introduction and chronology, followed by short sections on the design and development of the lines, Wellington's method of defense, the forts, life in the lines, aftermath and the lines today. Fletcher provides one very nice, 2-page color map of the lines, 2 period maps of the lines, and a map depicting Marshall Massena's retreat. The color plates by artist Bill Younghusband are decent, if not great (constructing one of the forts in the line, a cross-section of the great redoubt at Sobral, Forts 40-42, Fort San Vicente, Wellington inspecting French positions, and attacking a scarped hillside).
Wellington, ordered the construction of an extensive defensive position north of Lisbon in October 1809 in order to provide a final redoubt for the British if pressed by French invasion. Thousands of Portuguese civilians were used as the workforce to construct two main lines of defense, centered upon the craggy hilltops north of their capital. Construction required about one year and the result was a defensive system that stretched over 30 miles from the Atlantic coast to the Tagus River. In addition, Wellington's engineers put a major effort into countermobility operations, destroying all bridges and roads north of the lines to impede any French advance. As Fletcher notes, the lines were not a continuous barrier but a series of forts with interlocking fields of fire, barriers and defenses in depth. Wellington also instituted a "scorched earth" policy north of the lines, destroying grain and livestock as well as evacuating Portuguese civilians, in order to deny the French a source of food or labor.
The lines were finished just in time, as Marshal Massena's army approached Lisbon in October 1810. Wellington manned the fortifications themselves with 30,000 Portuguese troops and over 400 cannon, leaving his 29,000 British troops as a mobile reserve to counterattack any French penetration. Massena's army, already punished by a difficult march across Portugal and the painful Battle of Bussaco two weeks earlier, was dismayed when they bumped into the unexpectedly formidable Allied defenses. After sniffing around the east end of the lines for a month - including mounting a minor probe at one small section - the poorly-supplied French army began to withdraw.
In Fletcher's assessment, the Lines of Torres Vedras were "a total success" because they stopped the French invasion dead in its tracks. Fletcher, as some other British historians are prone to do, even refers to the lines as "impregnable." Yet is there really such a thing as an "impregnable defense" or is this merely a tradition of biased hyperbole? As Fletcher describes, most of the forts of the lines of Torres Vedras were built of dirt earthworks, some with stone walls, on top of very advantageous terrain. However, a key weakness was that the forts had little or no overhead cover and were therefore vulnerable to plunging fire from French mortars or howitzers. Fletcher fails to mention that Massena's army had such mortars and that they had been used to reduce the far more impressive stone fortress of Almeida only seven weeks prior. It is also questionable whether the British had a real plan to defend the lines in time of limited visibility, such as darkness or fog (granted, night attacks were rare in this period). In fact, Fletcher notes that the French used the extensive fog in the area to cover their withdrawal. However, the greatest weakness of the lines was logistical. Although the Royal Navy brought in enough supplies to feed the British army, the Portuguese capital jammed with thousands of refugees was vulnerable to starvation. Indeed, Fletcher estimates that about 2% of the Portuguese population starved to death in this brief period of French invasion. What if Massena had merely begun constructing his own double line of defense, say 5 kilometers north of Torres Vedras, to keep the British in and starve the Portuguese out? Since the British had destroyed all the roads and bridges in front of their own defenses, they would have found it difficult to attack out of the lines. Fletcher is fair in assessing that the lines remain "something of an enigma" since they were never truly tested by the French. Unfortunately, Fletcher is less than fair in assessing why the French failed to test the defenses. Massena's army had an extremely tenuous line of supply back to Spain, much of which was partially interdicted by guerrillas. At best, Massena had about 55,000 troops to try and batter through a fortified line held by about 52,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops. A 1:1 odds attack, virtually out of supply against an entrenched enemy with naval support would have been very foolhardy and could have resulted in the dissolution of the French Army of Portugal. Massena wisely chose to withdraw in order to re-supply. Thus, the Lines of Torres Vedras have always seemed very formidable because operational circumstances were so unfavorable for the French from the start. Yet had Napoleon decided to make a major effort in the Peninsula in 1811 and spend the effort to build up a series of logistical bases and roads into Portugal, Monsieur Wellington might have found that it took a lot more than well-sited dirt forts to stop the Grande Armée.
The Lines of Torres Vedras 1809-1811 begins with a short introduction and chronology, followed by short sections on the design and development of the lines, Wellington's method of defense, the forts, life in the lines, aftermath and the lines today. Fletcher provides one very nice, 2-page color map of the lines, 2 period maps of the lines, and a map depicting Marshall Massena's retreat. The color plates by artist Bill Younghusband are decent, if not great (constructing one of the forts in the line, a cross-section of the great redoubt at Sobral, Forts 40-42, Fort San Vicente, Wellington inspecting French positions, and attacking a scarped hillside).
Wellington, ordered the construction of an extensive defensive position north of Lisbon in October 1809 in order to provide a final redoubt for the British if pressed by French invasion. Thousands of Portuguese civilians were used as the workforce to construct two main lines of defense, centered upon the craggy hilltops north of their capital. Construction required about one year and the result was a defensive system that stretched over 30 miles from the Atlantic coast to the Tagus River. In addition, Wellington's engineers put a major effort into countermobility operations, destroying all bridges and roads north of the lines to impede any French advance. As Fletcher notes, the lines were not a continuous barrier but a series of forts with interlocking fields of fire, barriers and defenses in depth. Wellington also instituted a "scorched earth" policy north of the lines, destroying grain and livestock as well as evacuating Portuguese civilians, in order to deny the French a source of food or labor.
The lines were finished just in time, as Marshal Massena's army approached Lisbon in October 1810. Wellington manned the fortifications themselves with 30,000 Portuguese troops and over 400 cannon, leaving his 29,000 British troops as a mobile reserve to counterattack any French penetration. Massena's army, already punished by a difficult march across Portugal and the painful Battle of Bussaco two weeks earlier, was dismayed when they bumped into the unexpectedly formidable Allied defenses. After sniffing around the east end of the lines for a month - including mounting a minor probe at one small section - the poorly-supplied French army began to withdraw.
In Fletcher's assessment, the Lines of Torres Vedras were "a total success" because they stopped the French invasion dead in its tracks. Fletcher, as some other British historians are prone to do, even refers to the lines as "impregnable." Yet is there really such a thing as an "impregnable defense" or is this merely a tradition of biased hyperbole? As Fletcher describes, most of the forts of the lines of Torres Vedras were built of dirt earthworks, some with stone walls, on top of very advantageous terrain. However, a key weakness was that the forts had little or no overhead cover and were therefore vulnerable to plunging fire from French mortars or howitzers. Fletcher fails to mention that Massena's army had such mortars and that they had been used to reduce the far more impressive stone fortress of Almeida only seven weeks prior. It is also questionable whether the British had a real plan to defend the lines in time of limited visibility, such as darkness or fog (granted, night attacks were rare in this period). In fact, Fletcher notes that the French used the extensive fog in the area to cover their withdrawal. However, the greatest weakness of the lines was logistical. Although the Royal Navy brought in enough supplies to feed the British army, the Portuguese capital jammed with thousands of refugees was vulnerable to starvation. Indeed, Fletcher estimates that about 2% of the Portuguese population starved to death in this brief period of French invasion. What if Massena had merely begun constructing his own double line of defense, say 5 kilometers north of Torres Vedras, to keep the British in and starve the Portuguese out? Since the British had destroyed all the roads and bridges in front of their own defenses, they would have found it difficult to attack out of the lines. Fletcher is fair in assessing that the lines remain "something of an enigma" since they were never truly tested by the French. Unfortunately, Fletcher is less than fair in assessing why the French failed to test the defenses. Massena's army had an extremely tenuous line of supply back to Spain, much of which was partially interdicted by guerrillas. At best, Massena had about 55,000 troops to try and batter through a fortified line held by about 52,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops. A 1:1 odds attack, virtually out of supply against an entrenched enemy with naval support would have been very foolhardy and could have resulted in the dissolution of the French Army of Portugal. Massena wisely chose to withdraw in order to re-supply. Thus, the Lines of Torres Vedras have always seemed very formidable because operational circumstances were so unfavorable for the French from the start. Yet had Napoleon decided to make a major effort in the Peninsula in 1811 and spend the effort to build up a series of logistical bases and roads into Portugal, Monsieur Wellington might have found that it took a lot more than well-sited dirt forts to stop the Grande Armée.
Digo eu: O autor deste comentário ( que em minha opinião não está mau) é R. A Forczyc (deve ser descendente de polacos). Vem na Amazon é só clicar para ver o que se diz mais sobre o livro.
É interessante assinalar que as Linhas de Torres ainda hoje são consideradas como um dos mais bem guardados segredos de guerra do Mundo. Esse segredo fez com que Massena, se deparasse subitamente com um muro intransponível, quando julgava que Lisboa estaria a seus pés em poucos dias. O segredo das Linhas de Torres, permitiu a Portugal, não só defender-se, mas também, contra atacar os exércitos invasores de Napoleão e a seguir "correr os franceses até Tulosa" como dizia meu tetravô que deixou o dito, dito nas lembranças de família até hoje.
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